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Abstract
This paper provides a structural estimation of an equilibrium search model with on-the-
job search and heterogeneity in ¯rms' productivities using a sample of Italian workers.
Allowing for productivity di®erentials among ¯rms, the model is able to ¯t the wage dis-
tribution satisfactorily. Results indicate that arrival rates of o®ers for workers are higher
when unemployed than when employed and ¯rms exploit their monopsnony power when
setting wages. As a result, workers earn far less than their marginal product. The pa-
per also provides an estimate of the underlying distribution of productivity across ¯rms.
Geographical strati¯cation reveals also interesting di®erences in transition parameters
across workers.
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1 Introduction
Wage regressions are probably one of the most widely estimated equations in labour eco-
nomics. The identi¯cation of underlying theoretical parameters and the decomposition of
observed wage variation represent two of the main areas of research in the ¯eld. However,
results from reduced form approaches indicate that at most half of observed dispersion in
wages can be "explained" by observable characteristics, and that the rest has to be imputed
to measurement error or unobservable components. Search models explain observed variation
in wages as resulting from productivity di®erentials and search frictions. The relative contri-
bution of the two components is identi¯ed by structurally estimating the relevant parameters
of equilibrium search models.
During recent years, some important theoretical contributions establish that wage dis-
persion is an equilibrium outcome even if workers and ¯rms are homogeneous (Burdett and
Mortensen, 1998). Moreover the obtained equilibrium distribution of wages comes in closed
form solution allowing for an empirical estimation of such models. It is no surprise that these
¯ndings have been accompanied by a growing empirical literature dealing with the structural
estimation of these equilibrium search models (see Van den Berg, 1999). Behind this research
e®ort there are two main reasons. On the one hand, the partial equilibrium search models are
not able to fully characterise equilibrium labour market outcomes (Rothschild, 1973); on the
other hand, new available information on labour market histories of workers and ¯rms adds
considerable information to our understanding of labour market phenomena. Equilibrium
search theory provides also a renewed framework for labour market policy analysis with an
active role for ¯rms as pro¯t maximisers. This framework is also suitable for comparative
statics exercises and test for some policy implications in an equilibrium environment that
were not possible in previous search models (e.g., minimum wage). The second important
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ingredient is the possibility of accessing until now unavailable information on labour mar-
ket histories of workers and ¯rms, and then structurally estimate the relevant parameters
deriving from the theory.1
In an environment characterised by perfect information, the result of a wage posting game
among homogeneous ¯rms is the Bertrand outcome. The distribution of wages degenerates
at the competitive equilibrium level. The introduction of some imperfections in this environ-
ment implies that the competitive outcome doesn't hold. The resulting distribution of wages
degenerates at the monopsonistic level and the worker doesn't receive any surplus from the
match (Diamond, 1971). Introducing search frictions, simply intended as time required for
agents to obtain information, generates match speci¯c rents that are shared between workers
and ¯rms. The perfectly competitive outcome (workers are paid their marginal product and
enjoy all the surplus deriving from the match) and the monopsonistic result (workers do not
get any fraction of the surplus and ¯rms have complete monopoly power in o®ering wages)
constitute the limiting cases in a framework that provides an alternative explanation to the
(simple) marginal productivity theory of wages. In such an environment, search frictions
give the employers some monopsony power, but this power is limited by competition with
other employers over time. Firms can implement some wage policies, in the sense that they
face a trade-o® between posting high wages and attracting workers. With on-the-job-search,
higher wages mean less pro¯t per worker but more workers and less probability of quitting
behaviour of "insiders"; ¯rms ¯ll vacancies more quickly and equalise pro¯ts with respect to
low wage ¯rms enjoying a greater labour force.
The possibility of a wage distribution as an equilibrium outcome comes in an elegant
1 It is important to remember that although equilibrium search models can be estimated from workers'
data only, the recent availability of so-called matched employer-employee data sets adds considerable amount
of information to our previous knowledge. Firm data can be particularly useful for structural estimations of
equilibrium search models.
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closed form solution (Burdett and Mortensen, 1998; Mortensen, 1990).2 However, the
model in its basic form has the implication that both densities for the distribution of wages
o®ered and the distribution of wages actually paid to employees (earnings distribution), are
increasing and left skewed with the wages concentrated near the competitive equilibrium.
This characteristic is clearly at odds with the form of the earnings distribution that we
observe in reality that has a (log)normal shape with a very long right tail. As a consequence,
the empirical implementation of equilibrium search models has mostly focused on ¯tting the
right tail of the wage distribution.
The ¯rst attempts to structurally estimate the relevant parameters of the pure homoge-
neous Burdett and Mortensen (1998) model give unsatisfactory results, given they are not
able to ¯t the wage distribution (see Van den Berg and Ridder, 1993a, 1993b; and Kiefer
and Neumann,1993).3 To ¯t the right tail of the distribution, it is essential to introduce
some kind of heterogeneity across worker/¯rms' productivities or measurement error. Het-
erogeneity can be modelled along various dimensions.4 Allowing productivity levels to vary
across di®erent segments of the labour market, as de¯ned by occupation, education or age
categories permits a reasonable ¯t to the data. Van den Berg and Ridder (1998) and Ridder
and Van den Berg (1997) allow for this kind of between-markets observable heterogeneity.
On the other hand, Bowlus et al. (1995, 2001), and Bontemps et al. (1999, 2000) estimate
equilibrium search models assuming ¯rms di®er in their productivity level within the same
market. The former approach allows for a discrete distribution of productivity types, whereas
2 See also Butters (1977), Reinganum (1979), Burdett and Judd (1983), and Albrecht and Axell (1984)
for di®erent models of equilibrium wage dispersion.
3 A previous version of my paper provides estimation of the structural parameters for the basic Burdett
and Mortensen (1998) model. Results are available upon request.
4 Eckstein and Wolpin (1990) are the ¯rst to estimate an equilibrium search model from panel data. Using
Albrecht and Axell (1984) equilibrium model with ex-ante heterogeneity if workers' reservation wages, they
¯nd that worker heterogeneity is not very important in explaining observed wage dispersion.
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the latter ¯ts the data assuming a continuous distribution of productivities.5
This paper provides a structural estimation of the relevant parameters of the equilibrium
search model allowing for a continuous distribution of productivity across ¯rms.6 First, I
provide a non-parametric estimation of the distribution of earned wages; then I structurally
estimate the frictional parameters of the equilibrium model using maximum likelihood tech-
niques. Finally, conditional on previous steps, I can recover an estimate of the distribution
of productivities across ¯rms in the market and a measure of their monopsony power exerted
when posting wages. The estimation method proves particularly e®ective to study the dy-
namics of wage mobility in a structural approach. To the best of my knowledge, this paper
represents the ¯rst attempt of studying those dynamics in such a framework using Italian
data. Given this, I compare my results with those found by Bontemps et al. (2000) for
France.7
The main ¯ndings of the paper can be identi¯ed as follows. The arrival rate of employment
of opportunities when unemployed is ten times higher than the one when employed. The low
level of search while on-the-job negatively a®ects the speed at which workers climb the job
ladder: Italian workers receive on average 0.5 acceptable o®ers per month. The estimated
distribution of productivities in the economy indicates that this distribution is much more
dispersed and polarised at very low and high levels than the corresponding wage distribution.
Moreover, the mapping from productivity to wages indicates that high productivity ¯rms
o®er proportionally higher wages. In general, ¯rms are well able to exploit their monopsony
power and appropriate most of the rents from the match. Strati¯cation by observable worker
characteristics also indicates interesting di®erences among groups. Finally, some interesting
5 Bowlus et al. (2001) examine advantages and disadvantages of the two approaches.
6 The estimation methodology is the "three" step method as proposed by Bontemps et al. (2000).
7 Launov (2003) analyses labour market dynamics in an equilibrium search environment using Austrian
data.
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patterns in regional productivity di®erentials are recognised.
The rest of the paper is organised as follows: in section two I present the theoretical
equilibrium search model with productivity dispersion across ¯rms. Then, in section three
I describe the data and the selection of the sample. The estimation method and results are
also provided. In the last section, I conclude and discuss some further research issues.
2 The Equilibrium Search Model
Here I provide a complete description of the Burdett and Mortensen (1998) equilibrium search
model. The model is also extended along the lines proposed by Bontemps et al. (2000). In
the original version with homogeneous workers and ¯rms, the economy is composed by a
large number of ¯rms whose measure is normalised to 1; m is the large number of workers
in the economy. It is assumed that the worker can be in one of the two states, employed or
unemployed, and u is the number of unemployed. Workers are assumed to search both when
employed and unemployed. In both cases the probability of receiving an o®er is distributed
according to a standard Poisson process where ¸0 is the arrival rate of job o®ers while
unemployed and ¸1 when employed. R is the reservation wage when unemployed, while the
wage earned w is the reservation wage when employed. When unemployed a worker has utility
°ow given by b, this is assumed equal among workers and can be interpreted as the value of
leisure or the level of unemployment bene¯t per period. When employed, workers earn their
wage w and p is the °ow revenue generated per employed worker, a ¯rm earns p ¡ w when
the job is ¯lled. There is no endogenous job destruction deriving from productivity shocks,
but ± is the exogenous probability that a job is destroyed at every moment in time. De¯ne
k0 = ¸0=± and k1 = ¸1=±. F (w) is the distribution of wages o®ered to workers and G(w)
is the distribution of wages actually paid to employed workers. The latter is the earnings
distribution. First analyse the behaviour of workers. They adopt a strategy of search that
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has the reservation wage property, the latter (with zero discounting) is given by
R¡ b = [k0 ¡ k1]
Z 1
R
1¡ F (x)
1 + k1[1¡ F (x)]dx: (1)
The reservation wage of unemployed workers is given by the value of leisure plus the expected
gain from search while employed. For unemployed workers, it is optimal to accept any wage
above the reservation wage. Given the di®erence k0¡ k1, the expected gains from search are
determined by the probability of getting an o®er higher than the actual wage, discounted by
the probability that the job is terminated (both for exogenous destruction or because of a
better opportunity). Employed workers adopt a reservation strategy as well and will accept
any wage strictly greater than w.
The equation of motion of unemployment in this economy is given by the di®erence
between the °ow in and the °ow out of the stock. In steady state
±(m¡ u) = ¸0[1¡ F (R)]u:
Since F (R) is equal to zero because no worker will accept a wage below the reservation wage,
further manipulations give the equilibrium unemployment rate
u
m
=
±
± + ¸0
: (2)
This expression is increasing in ± and decreasing in ¸0.
Let G(w)(m ¡ u) be the number of employed receiving a wage no greater than w; the
evolution of this stock over time is given by
dG(w)(m¡ u)
dt
= ¸0F (w)u¡ [± + ¸1(1¡ F (w))]G(w)(m¡ u);
where the ¯rst part of the right hand side refers to the °ow of workers that are unemployed
and receive an acceptable o®er above their reservation wage (and below w), and the second
is the sum of workers previously holding a job that has been destroyed and those who ¯nd a
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better opportunity and quit the old job. The °ows in and out of this group should be equal
in a steady state, so that the distribution of wages currently paid reads as
G(w) =
F (w)
1 + k1[1¡ F (w)] : (3)
The fraction of workers receiving a wage less or equal to w is given by the fraction of ¯rms
o®ering that particular wage (or less), divided by the probability that the job is either
destroyed or the worker quits. Equation (3) represents the structural relationship between
the distribution of wages actually paid to employed workers and the distribution of wages
o®ered, as imposed by the steady state condition.
Let l(wjR;F ) be the measure of workers per ¯rm earning a wage w given R and F: That
speci¯es the steady state number of workers available to a ¯rm o®ering a particular wage
conditional on the wage o®ered by other ¯rms, represented by F; and the workers' reservation
wage R. This measure can be written as
l(wjR;F ) = g(w)
f(w)
(m¡ u); (4)
where g(w) and f(w) are the densities of the corresponding distributions. This expression is
increasing in w and continuous on the support of the distribution F . In what follows it is also
useful to recall again the structural relationships between the earnings and o®er distribution.
This is given by the following expression
f(w) =
1 + k1
[1 + k1G(w)]2
g(w): (5)
Using 5, substitute again in the expression for l(w):8 The latter can be rewritten as
l(wjR;F ) = [1 + k1G(w)]
2
1 + k1
(m¡ u): (6)
8 The expression 1¡ F (w) for the o®er distribution is given by
1¡ F (w) = 1¡G(w)
1 + k1G(w)
:
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This is the number of workers available to work at the ¯rm o®ering that particular wage w.9
Let's now look at the ¯rm's productivity. First the case with homogeneous ¯rms is analysed,
the model is then extended to allow for heterogeneity in ¯rms' productivities.
Homogeneous Firms. Firms post wages to maximise their steady state pro¯t °ow,
given R and F . p is the common °ow revenue generated by an employed worker, with
b < p < 1. When a worker and a ¯rm meet they do not bargain over the wage but divide
the surplus deriving form their match getting w ¡ b and p ¡ w respectively. Notice that
the wage has been previously ¯xed by the ¯rm to maximise the steady state °ow of pro¯ts.
Firms solve the following problem
¼(wjR;F ) = max
w
(p¡w)l(wjR;F ): (7)
An equilibrium is de¯ned as follows
De¯nition 2 (Burdett and Mortensen, 1998) An equilibrium solution to the search and
wage posting game is a triple fR;F; ¼g such that R satis¯es the reservation wage equation,
¼ satis¯es the ¯rm maximisation problem and F is such that: (p¡ w)l(wjR;F ) = ¼ for all
w in support of F , (p¡w)l(wjR;F ) · ¼ otherwise.
Burdett and Mortensen (1998) demonstrate that the equilibrium solution exists, is unique
and the wage o®er distribution is continuous and not degenerate with support [R;w].10 Any
employer o®ering a wage less than R in equilibrium would have no employee indeed. On the
other hand any employer o®ering a wage w ¸ R will have a positive workforce and pro¯ts.
Heterogeneous Firms. Assume now that ¯rms are heterogeneous with respect to their
labour productivity parameter p: Let ¡(p) denote the (continuous) distribution of produc-
tivity with support [p; p]: Under this assumption, the optimal strategy for the ¯rm is to
9 Again, the relationship can be expressed as
l(wjR;F ) = 1 + k1
[1 + k1(1¡ F (w))]2 (m¡ u):
10 First they rule out non continuous wage o®er distributions, i.e. no mass points can exist in the o®er
distribution. Any wage above it would give a greater pro¯t without losing applicants. O®ering a wage equal
to a mass point cannot be pro¯t maximising for ¯rms.
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post a wage in the set of pro¯t maximising wages. Let the function w = K(p) denotes the
mapping from the support of the productivity distribution to the support of the wage o®er
distribution.11 Notice that given continuity of this function, the mapping from productivity
to o®ered wages determines a continuous distribution for F (w). Firms maximise (7) with
respect to w. From the ¯rst order condition it is then possible to determine the ¯rm value
of the productivity parameter
p = w +
1+ k1G(w)
2k1g(w)
: (8)
Bontemps et al. (2000) also derive a closed form solution for the density of the productivity
of ¯rms that are active in the market equilibrium. This can be written as
°(p) =
2k1 (1 + k1) g(w)3
3k1g(w)2 [1 + k1G(w)]
2 ¡ g0(w) [1 + k1G(w)]3
: (9)
Finally, the wage o®er w = K(p) of a ¯rm with productivity p is equal to
w = K(p) = p¡ [1 + k1¡(p)]2
Z p
w
dx
[1 + k1¡(x)]2
: (10)
This is the central equation of the model (Bontemps et al., 2000). In this economy an
equilibrium is de¯ned as follows
De¯nition 3 (Bontemps et al., 2000) A market equilibrium is a triple (R;F (w);Kp)
such that
1. The distribution of wage o®ers in the economy is
F (w) =
Z
F (wjp)d¡(p)
where ¡(p) is the distribution of ¯rms active in the market.
2. R is the worker's best strategy to ¯rms' behaviour and satis¯es
R¡ b = [k0 ¡ k1]
Z 1
R
1¡ F (x)
1 + k1[1¡ F (x)]dx:
11 This function is continuous and monotone. See Bontemps et al. (2000) for proofs regarding uniqueness
and existence of the function.
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3. Kp = argmax
w
f¼(p; w)jR · w · pg is a set of pro¯t maximising wages of type p ¯rms
with ¼(p;w) de¯ned in (7) and Kp de¯ned in (10).
For the homogeneous case, Burdett and Mortensen (1998) show that as long as w = R
and ¸1 > 0; then the unique candidate for F for any p is
F (wjp) =
·
(1 + k1)
k1
¸"
1¡
µ
p¡w
p¡R
¶1=2#
8 w 2 [R;w]: (11)
Notice that in the standard basic Burdett and Mortensen (1998) model, the monopsonistic
solution is avoided allowing the employed workers to compare at every moment in time the
wage earned and the new job o®er arrivals. Extreme solutions can be obtained as limiting
cases: If k1 ! 0 ) w ! R ) R ! b, and the Diamond solution is obtained; on the
other hand if k1 ! 1 ) G(w) ! p, this is the case when frictions vanish; ¯nally as
k0 !1 as well, then the competitive equilibrium results (the o®er arrive instantaneously).
This completes the description of the theoretical models, in the next section I discuss the
empirical implementation of the model and present the estimation strategy.
3 Empirical Analysis
The closed form solution obtained by Burdett and Mortensen (1998) for the equilibrium
distribution of wages allows an empirical estimation of the model using data on both workers
and ¯rms. Nonetheless, the model in its basic form has the implication that densities for
both the distribution of wage o®ers F and that of the wages paid G are increasing and left
skewed with the wages concentrated near the competitive equilibrium p. This characteristic
is clearly at odds with the form of the distribution that we observe in reality that has a
(log)normal shape with a very long right tail.
In the case of perfect homogeneity among workers and ¯rms, the relevant parameters to
be estimated are: b; the workers' common value of non market time; p; the ¯rms' common
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value of productivity; the two ratios k0 and k1 (or ¸0 and ¸1 alternatively); and the job
separation (or destruction) rate ±. If b is unobserved then, R is the ¯fth parameter.12 To
get a satisfactory ¯t of the wage distribution is necessary to introduce some heterogeneity
among ¯rms. When ¯rms are assumed to di®er with respect to their productivity parameter,
it is also possible to get an estimate of this distribution using estimated transition parameters
and information from the distribution of wages paid to workers actually employed. Before
discussing the estimation method, in the next subsection, I brie°y present the data.
3.1 Data
In this study, I use a matched employer-employee data base from Italian Administrative
Archives representative of the population of employed workers in the private non-farm sector.
The source of information is the National Social Security Institute (INPS).13 Data from Isfol-
Inps data base contain all the relevant information I need to estimate an equilibrium search
model.14 The main di±culty with this data set is related to the de¯nition of the status
of a worker and his/her classi¯cation. While the position while employed is illuminating
about the actual position in the labour market, on the other hand, if the worker exits the
market, it is impossible to know if the subsequent period of absence from the records is due
to unemployment, work in the public sector, self-employment or retirement. This relevant
problem is also related to the impossibility of knowing exactly if the worker has been laid o®
or the end of the job has been determined by a voluntary separation.15
To estimate the relevant parameters of the equilibrium search model I use a sub-sample
12 If a minimum wage is binding in the labour market, then the lower bound of the distribution is auto-
matically determined. Van den Berg (1999) discusses the issue.
13 See, among others, Casavola et al. (1999) and Contini (2002) for an accurate description of the dataset
and extensive applications.
14 Other important studies have used a source of information almost identical to mine. In particular,
Postel-Vinay and Robin (2002) estimate their equilibrium model using the French Administrative DADS
panel.
15 See Brugiavini and Brunello (1998) for discussions about this problem.
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Table 1: Descriptive Statistics (see Appendix)
of workers observed during a the period 1985-1996. I look at the current status of all workers
in the sample in February 1991. Then, I observe elapsed and residual duration in the state
(employment or unemployment), the wage actually earned or accepted when exiting unem-
ployment and, for those employed, the next transition to another job or unemployment (or
censoring). In Table 1 in the Appendix I report descriptive statistics for the sample used
in the estimation. I restrict my attention to male workers. Apprentices are excluded as are
part time workers. Finally I trim the lowest 1% and highest 99% tails of the overall wage
distribution.16
3.2 The Likelihood Function and Estimation Method
In what follows I sketch out the procedure used to estimate the model as proposed by
Bontemps et al. (2000) on French data. The model allows for two states in the market:
employment and unemployment. A binary variable indicates the state of the agent in Febru-
ary 1991, where employed workers take 0 and unemployed 1. De¯ne elapsed and residual
durations. Let tib and tif denote these durations with i = 0; 1: De¯ne left and right censored
observations for those spells in progress in January 1985 and December 1996. Let dib and
dif denote those indicators. For each worker in the sample I then observe paid or accepted
wages. Let w0 and w1 denote these variables. Finally, for those employed at the date se-
lected, I can determine the outcome of their ¯rst transition, given the duration is not right
censored. The model allows for two destinations upon exiting from previous employment:
16 Following Contini (2002), yearly wages are de°ated with the CPI at 1996 prices. Then, to make them
comparable across workers with di®erent number of days worked during the year, the following adjustment is
adopted: realwage=(yearly wage/days paid)*26 where 26 is the average number of days worked during the
month.
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job to unemployment and direct job-to-job transition.17
The likelihood is obtained by multiplication of the individual contributions. Below, the
derivation of the likelihood of each observation is provided.
Unemployed Workers. The probability of drawing an unemployed worker is u=m =
1=(1+k0). The distribution of elapsed and residual unemployment durations is assumed
to be exponential. The exit rate from unemployment is ¸0, and the likelihood is
¸
2¡d0b¡d0f
0
(1 + k0)
exp [¡¸0(t0b + t0f )] f(w0)1¡d0f : (12)
Employed Workers. The probability of sampling an employed individual is 1 ¡ u=m =
k0=(1 + k0). The job duration, given w1; is exponentially distributed with parameter
±, while the employment relationship has exponential duration with parameter ± +
¸1F (w1).18 The likelihood reads as
k0
(1 + k0)
g(w)
£
± + ¸1F (w1)
¤1¡d1b exp©¡ £± + ¸1F (w1)¤ (t1b + t1f )ªn±v £¸1F (w1)¤1¡vo1¡d1f ;
(13)
where v is equal to one if the employment relationship terminates into unemployment.
The model is fully characterised by the ¯ve unknowns parameters ¡; ¸0; ¸1; ±, and R. The
frictional parameters are identi¯ed from the duration data, the productivity distribution is
identi¯ed from the empirical distribution of wages observed and R is identi¯ed as the lowest
wage observed in the sample.19
The nonparametric estimation procedure can be outlined as follows.
17 Following Contini (2002) and Postel-Vinay and Robin (2002) I arbitrarily de¯ne as job-to-job transitions
those moves with an intervening period of unemployment less or equal to one month.
18 Where F (w1) = 1¡ F (w):
19 See Kiefer and Neumann (1993).
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1. First I estimate G(w) and g(w) using a nonparametric procedure. I use a standard
Gaussian kernel estimator for the density and the empirical cumulative distribution for
G(w). Let bG and bg denote such estimates. Conditional on k1, consistent estimates of
F and f are
bF (w) = 1¡ bG(w)
1 + k1 bG(w) (14)
and
bf(w) = 1 + k1h
1 + k1 bG(w)i2bg(w) (15)
2. Replace F and f in the likelihood function by the preceding expressions, and maximize
the likelihood with respect to k0, k1, and ±.
3. Estimate p = K¡1(w) and °(p) using the equations below
p = w +
1 + k1G(w)
2k1g(w)
;
°(p) =
2k1 (1 + k1) g(w)
3
3k1g(w)2 [1 + k1G(w)]
2 ¡ g0(w) [1 + k1G(w)]3
;
where p represents a ¯rm-speci¯c constant value of productivity, °(p) denotes the den-
sity of the productivity distribution and g0(w) is obtained by di®erentiation of the earnings
density.
It is important to recognise that the procedure can be decomposed in two separate parts.
The ¯rst two steps basically analyse only worker behaviour and do not look at the ¯rms,
while the third exploits information recovered from previous steps to get the distribution of
productivity. The latter is obtained without assuming any parametric form.
3.3 Results
It is a well known fact that standard wage regression are able to explain at most 50% of
wage variation across individuals. The remaining variation in wages is imputed to standard
14
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Figure 1: Kernel Density Estimates of Earnings and O®er Wages
measurement error and other unobservable factors. Equilibrium search models try to decom-
pose wage variation in two main components, variation due to di®erences in productivity
across ¯rms and variation due to search frictions. Moreover, equilibrium search models make
speci¯c predictions about the shape of earnings and accepted wages. In the theoretical sec-
tion this relationship has been characterised in a steady state equilibrium. In general, the
expected empirical relationship is that of ¯rst order stochastic dominance of the earnings
distribution on the wage o®er. In Figure 1 this prediction is explicitly tested using standard
kernel estimations of the two densities. The earnings distribution is shifted to the right,
indicating that higher wages are more likely to be earned for those employed in February
1991. The distribution of accepted wages after unemployment is instead more concentrated
at lower wages.
In Table 2 estimation results for transition parameters are presented. The ¯rst interesting
result is that of an arrival rate of acceptable wage o®ers when employed much lower than the
one when unemployed; ¸1's estimate for the all sample is almost ten times larger than ¸0:
According to these results, the estimated average duration of unemployment is equal to 23
15
Table 2: Transition Parameters
± ¸0 ¸1 k1
All Sample 0.0128 0.0431 0.0064 0.5039
[0.0127, 0.0128 ] [0.0427, 0.0436] [0.0063, 0.0068] [0.4925, 0.5218]
Blue Collars 0.0139 0.0421 0.0053 0.383
[0.0138, 0.0140] [0.0415, 0.0427] [0.0051, 0.0055] [0.3742, 0.3920]
White Collars 0.0109 0.0466 0.0103 0.9472
[0.0107, 0.0111] [0.0450, 0.0484] [0.0097, 0.0108] [0.8802, 0.9953]
Managers 0.0122 0.0786 0.0655 5.3561
[0.0115, 0.0132] [0.0630, 0.1070] [0.0408, 0.1373] [3.3168, 10.892]
15-25 0.0251 0.0350 0.0079 0.3154
[0.0247, 0.0254] [0.0339, 0.0359] [0.0073, 0.0085] [0.2926, 0.3429]
26-40 0.0126 0.0475 0.0060 0.4762
[0.0124, 0.0128 ] [0.0465, 0.0483] [0.0057, 0.0063] [0.4525, 0.5114]
41-50 0.0098 0.0709 0.0040 0.4111
[0.0097, 0.0099] [0.0677, 0.0737] [0.0039, 0.0042] [0.4005, 0.4288]
Time period is month. 5% and 95% percentiles of the bootstrap distribution in square brackets.
months. On the other hand, the average duration of an employment relationship terminated
by the worker with a quit is equal to 156 months. This indicates that on-the-job search
activity is very low and that job search reveals much more pro¯table when unemployed. On
the other hand, the job destruction rate is estimated close to 0.012, with an average duration
of the job of 83 months. Finally, k1 = ¸1=± gives a measure of the speed at which workers
climb the wage ladder. It can be also interpreted as the average number of o®ers received in
the time interval. Assuming an equal opportunity of receiving better o®ers during the year,
the average number of o®ers if equal to six for a random worker in this sample.
As predicted by the theory, transition parameters provide a measure of the importance of
search frictions in the labour market. However, workers di®er according to some observable
and unobservable characteristics that a®ect their labour market outcomes. Strati¯cation of
the sample according to worker characteristics gives some indication of the di®erence in the
degree of search frictions that workers face when looking for a job. Results in Table 2 indicate
interesting di®erences among di®erent occupations and age groups. As expected managers
rank very high in the probability of getting outside o®ers, their estimated arrival rate of
16
o®ers is equal to 0.06 per month with an average number of o®ers per month greater than
¯ve. On the other hand, job destruction rates are almost constant across di®erent groups
with a somewhat higher rate for blue collars. Strati¯cation by di®erent age groups provides
expected results with higher job destruction rate for young workers and higher probability
of moves for them. Results in the last column of the Table also con¯rm well known ¯ndings
about the concave relationship between wage and experience in the labour market, with an
increasing pro¯le in early stages of the career and with a °attening in late stages.
Transition parameters illustrate interesting results about the degree of search frictions
in the labour market and fully characterise the distribution of wages in equilibrium search
models. However, as previously discussed, the model in its pure form is not able to ¯t
the wage distribution and some form of heterogeneity if ¯rms' productivities is necessary
to get satisfactory results. The estimation method allows also to recover an estimate of
the productivity parameter for each ¯rm and consequently look at the characteristics of the
productivity distribution in the economy. In Figure 2 the estimated productivity distribution
is reported using a standard kernel method.20 The graph indicates that most of the ¯rms
are concentrated in the lower and higher percentiles of the distribution and that the density
in the very long tail of the distribution tends to zero, as predicted by the model and as found
when approximating the distribution by some parametric family (e.g., the Pareto family is
often used). It should be noted here that the productivity distribution is much more dispersed
and concentrated at extreme values than the wage distributions. I will return to these issues
in more detail when discussing the strati¯cation by regional area of work of ¯rms.
Figure 3 looks at the estimated mapping between productivity and o®ered wages. The
estimated wage o®er function K indicates that the relationship is increasing at all levels of
20 To ease exposition, it should be noted that the plot has excluded the 1% lowest and 99% highest
observations.
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Figure 2: Kernel Density Estimates of Estimated Distribution of Productivity
productivity but is characterised by an in°ection point at median productivity levels. The
relationship appears somewhat concave at lower levels to become convex at higher levels of
productivity.
The above results should then be analysed looking at the monopsony power index (Figure
4). The latter is de¯ned as MPI = [p¡K(p)] =p and gives a direct measure of the degree
of exploitation of labour market frictions by ¯rms when setting wages. The index varies
between 0 and 1 with higher values indicating a lot of monopsony power from ¯rms in setting
wages. This condition can be theoretically identi¯ed as one of very low mobility and almost
no search while on-the-job. The index gives also a measure of the proportion of the rents
that accrue to workers when starting an employment relationship, or how far are workers
from being paid their marginal product p: Figure 4 indicates that ¯rms are able to extract
almost all the surplus from their workers. The relationship is concave with an asymptotic
tendency toward one for high productivity ¯rms. This results can be easily interpreted in the
theoretical framework proposed in this paper. Given very low level of on-the-job search and
a few opportunities to move to better-paying wages, ¯rms are able to extract all the surplus
18
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Figure 3: Mapping from Productivity to Wages, Percentiles - Log Scale
from their workers paying them wages just above their value of leisure. However, the pattern
is somewhat di®erent for low productivity and high productivity ¯rms. The mapping from
productivity to wages in Figure 3 indicates that high productivity ¯rms o®er proportionally
higher wages compared to those paid by ¯rms in the lower part of the distribution. Higher
productivity and higher o®ered wages have opposite e®ect on the monopsony index; in this
case it seems that, at least for high productivity ¯rms, paying higher wages doesn't harm
their capacity of getting most of the rents deriving from the match.
Previous results indicate that the degree of search frictions in Italian labour market is
considerable. Workers face di±culties in climbing the job ladder and ¯rms are able to exploit
the monopsnony power that accrues to them because of the presence of information problem
in the market. However, estimates of transition parameters indicate that segmentation of the
labour market by observable characteristics of workers can help us to identify those groups
that are more severely damaged in this context. Results found for di®erent age groups
and for di®erent occupation categories con¯rm previous expectations. However, monopsony
power of ¯rms and low mobility can also be ampli¯ed by a low level of geographical mobility
19
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Figure 4: Monopsony Power versus Log Productivity
of workers across di®erent areas. In what follows, I try to shed some light on this issue
separately looking at four macro-regions. This exercise could also prove useful when looking
at productivity di®erentials in regional contexts.21
Figure 6 in the Appendix provides kernel estimates of earnings and o®ered wages for
di®erent areas. The striking result is that the predicted stochastic dominance relationship
between the earnings and o®er distribution is not con¯rmed for the South: accepted and
earning wages seem to collapse to the same distribution. A visual inspection indicates that it
is the distribution of accepted wages after unemployment that collapses towards the earnings
distribution. This could indicate that workers in the South are more likely to get higher
wages upon exiting unemployment.22 Table 3 provides estimation results for arrival rates
across di®erent regions. As expected, results show some variability. Estimated parameters
21 See Contini (2002) for the problem of comparability between reported working days for ¯rms in the
North and the South of Italy.
22 It is hazardous to draw conclusion about this point. However, on the supply side, this e®ect can re°ect
more picky workers in the South with higher possibilities of work in the black market and relatively higher
reservation wages; on the demand side the e®ect can be explained along the lines proposed by Contini (2002);
¯rms in the South ¯re temporarily their workers allowing them to work under regular conditions only a part
of the year and hiring them again at previous wages.
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Table 3: Transition Parameters by Regions
± ¸0 ¸1 k1
North-west 0.0116 0.0477 0.0068 0.5907
[0.0115, 0.0117] [0.0463, 0.0488] [0.0065, 0.0071] [0.5597, 0.6179]
North-east 0.0122 0.0468 0.0073 0.6031
[0.0120, 0.0124] [0.0452, 0.0483] [0.0070, 0.0077] [0.5751, 0.6335]
Centre 0.0120 0.0416 0.0063 0.5236
[0.0118, 0.0122] [0.0401, 0.0426] [0.0060, 0.0068] [0.5012, 0.5676]
South 0.0159 0.0386 0.0047 0.2995
[0.0156, 0.0161] [0.0377, 0.0395] [0.0044, 0.0052] [0.2800, 0.3292]
Time period is month. 5% and 95% percentiles of the bootstrap distribution in square brackets.
for the South indicate slightly higher job destruction rate (0.0159 against 0.0116 for the
North-west). The arrival rate of acceptable o®ers is everywhere higher in other parts of the
Country with the highest value for the North-East. Above estimates are then summarised
in the k1 parameter with a value for the South that is almost half of the one estimated for
the North.
After estimating separately for each macro-region the density of earning wages and the
transition parameters, in Table 4 some properties of the estimated productivity distribution
are reported.23 Estimated values for productivity are very high given the low value of the
frictional parameters. It seems not particularly worth looking at absolute values, while it is
more interesting to look at some qualitative results. Some di®erences in the distribution of
the productivity across ¯rms for di®erent areas emerge when looking at standard descriptive
indicators for the distribution. First, the ratio between the 90th and 10th percentile indicates
that productivity dispersion is higher in the North-east of Italy. Although the distribution
is clearly right skewed, the degree of asymmetry is lower with respect to the one found for
other parts of the Country. On the contrary, in the South the distribution of productivity is
characterised by a strong concentration of ¯rms in the lower deciles with a very high peak
23 See also Figure 6 in the Appendix for a visual inspection of these issues.
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Table 4: Estimated Productivity Distribution
min p10 median p90 p90/p10 mean skewness kurtosis
North-west 2879 6908 55832 228627 33.09 102583 5.02 42.48
North-east 2838 6709 60838 362155 53.98 128684 2.79 15.97
Centre 3337 7299 49202 279558 38.30 121301 4.44 31.88
South 3135 7049 59767 293722 41.66 124696 5.56 53.70
Monetary values are expressed in 000s of Italian Lira.
in the productivity distribution.24 The mapping from productivity to wages and the value
of the monopsony power index do not indicate interesting di®erences across di®erent areas
(Figures 7-8).
4 Concluding Remarks
This paper provides an extensive empirical analysis of an equilibrium search model with
heterogeneity in ¯rms' productivities. The model is able to exploit the double source of wage
variation as advocated by equilibrium search models: on-the-job search and productivity
di®erentials across ¯rms. The latter is necessary to get a good ¯t of the wage distribution.
In particular, an exogenous continuous distribution of ¯rms' productivity is assumed to exist.
The model is structurally estimated using a "three steps" procedure as recently proposed
by Bontemps et al. (2000). First, the earnings distribution is estimated non-parametrically;
then these estimates are used to recover frictional parameters using maximum likelihood
methods. Conditional on the previous steps, in the third stage, an estimate of the produc-
tivity distribution is provided.
Results indicate that search frictions are important in the process of determination of
wages and that Italian ¯rms are able to extract from their workers most of the rents upon
formation of a match. Wages are increasing (and convex) function of productivity levels. High
24 Average productivity in the South is estimated to be higher than in other parts of the Country. Higher
capital/labour ratios can constitute an explanation for this fact. However the model doesn't have capital and
the interpretation of this result is left for future research.
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productivity ¯rms are able to o®er higher wages but still enjoy most of the match-speci¯c
rents. This result calls for interesting extensions of the model along the lines proposed by
Acemoglu and Shimer (2000). Introducing (endogenous) capital as production factor can
further help in explaining the source of wage dispersion before drawing policy conclusion
from this analysis.
This paper contributes to the new emerging literature dealing with the structural esti-
mation of equilibrium search models. To the best of my knowledge, it represents the ¯rst
attempt to analyse the Italian labour market in such a framework. As a consequence, my
results can be only compared to those obtained for other countries. In particular, the re-
sults presented in this study carry some resemblance with those obtained by Bontemps et al.
(2000) for France. In both countries ¯rms are well able to exploit their monopsony power
when the degree of estimated upward wage/labour mobility is very low. As a consequence
high productivity ¯rms can o®er high wages and still make big pro¯ts. Strati¯cation by
sector of activity as proposed by Bontemps et al. (2000) can prove useful to distinguish more
clearly those ¯rms. Providing further evidence on these issues is my future research agenda.
23
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Appendix: Figures and Tables
Figure 5: Kernel Density Estimates of Earned and O®ered Wages
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Figure 6: Kernel Density Estimates of Productivity Distribution
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Figure 7: Mapping From Productivity to Wages
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Figure 8: Monopsony Power Index vs Productivity
m
on
op
so
ny
 p
ow
er
 in
de
x
log productivity
9 10 11 12 13
.4
.6
.8
1
North West
m
on
op
so
ny
 p
ow
er
 in
de
x
log productivity
9 10 11 12 13
.4
.6
.8
1
North East
m
on
op
so
ny
 p
ow
er
 in
de
x
log productivity
9 10 11 12 13
.4
.6
.8
1
Centre
m
on
op
so
ny
 p
ow
er
 in
de
x
log productivity
8 10 12 14
.4
.6
.8
1
South
29
T
ab
le
1
:
D
es
cr
ip
ti
v
e
S
ta
ti
st
ic
s
A
ll
S
a
m
p
le
B
lu
e
C
o
ll
a
rs
W
h
it
e
C
o
ll
a
r
s
M
a
n
a
g
e
rs
1
5
-
2
5
2
6
-4
0
4
1
-5
0
N
o
r
t
h
-w
e
s
t
N
o
r
th
-e
a
s
t
C
e
n
tr
e
S
o
u
th
N
u
m
b
e
r
o
f
W
o
r
k
e
rs
6
0
,5
0
6
4
1
,2
2
3
1
8
,8
1
9
4
6
4
1
2
,9
0
4
3
1
,0
4
2
1
6
,5
2
3
2
0
,3
0
7
1
3
,3
5
1
1
1
,2
8
1
1
5
,5
5
7
U
n
e
m
p
lo
y
e
d
1
6
.4
8
%
1
9
.3
7
%
1
0
.4
0
%
5
.6
0
%
3
4
.1
0
%
1
4
.4
1
%
6
.4
2
%
1
2
.5
7
%
1
5
.4
0
%
1
5
.4
9
%
2
3
.2
2
%
E
m
p
lo
y
e
d
8
3
.5
2
%
8
0
.6
3
%
8
9
.6
0
%
9
4
.4
0
%
6
5
.9
0
%
8
5
.5
9
%
9
3
.5
8
%
8
7
.4
3
%
8
4
.6
0
%
8
4
:5
1
%
7
6
.7
8
%
A
g
e
:
m
e
a
n
(
s
td
d
e
v
)
3
3
.7
5
(8
.7
5
)
3
2
.9
4
(
8
.9
1
)
3
5
.3
2
(
8
.1
1
)
4
1
.6
9
(
5
.9
7
)
2
2
.5
1
(
2
.0
7
)
3
2
.3
4
(
4
.3
1
)
4
5
.2
0
(2
.8
0
)
3
3
.8
5
(8
.8
9
)
3
3
.1
6
(
8
.8
1
)
3
4
.6
2
(
8
.6
4
)
3
3
.9
3
(
8
.5
7
)
U
n
e
m
p
lo
y
e
d
le
ft
c
e
n
s
o
r
e
d
3
6
%
3
4
%
4
4
%
2
3
%
4
3
%
3
1
%
2
3
%
3
7
%
3
2
%
3
8
%
3
6
%
ri
g
h
t
c
e
n
s
o
r
e
d
1
5
%
1
5
%
1
3
%
1
5
%
1
4
%
1
6
%
1
4
%
1
2
%
1
2
%
1
7
%
1
7
%
D
u
r
a
t
io
n
(
n
o
t
c
e
n
s
o
r
e
d
)
m
e
a
n
(s
td
d
e
v
)
2
4
.3
7
(
2
1
.4
2
)
2
4
.1
8
(
2
5
.3
0
)
2
5
.3
0
(2
1
.9
6
)
2
4
.4
1
(
2
1
.2
2
)
2
3
.4
4
(
2
0
.5
7
)
2
5
.1
9
(2
2
.1
5
)
2
4
.2
2
(2
1
.2
5
)
2
3
.9
6
(
2
2
.0
3
)
2
3
.1
1
(
2
2
.0
1
)
2
4
.7
9
(2
1
.4
3
)
2
5
.2
4
(2
0
.5
8
)
E
m
p
lo
y
e
d
T
r
a
n
s
it
io
n
s
e
!
u
1
3
%
1
3
%
1
2
%
1
2
%
1
5
%
1
4
%
1
0
%
1
5
%
1
5
%
1
3
%
9
%
T
r
a
n
s
it
io
n
s
e
!
u
8
7
%
8
7
%
8
8
%
8
8
%
8
5
%
8
6
%
9
0
%
8
5
%
8
5
%
8
7
%
9
1
%
le
ft
c
e
n
s
o
r
e
d
2
5
%
2
3
%
2
7
%
2
8
%
1
%
2
4
%
4
0
%
2
5
%
2
7
%
2
5
%
2
1
%
ri
g
h
t
c
e
n
s
o
r
e
d
4
1
%
3
9
%
4
6
%
4
3
%
2
9
%
4
3
%
4
5
%
4
5
%
4
1
%
4
3
%
3
6
%
D
u
r
a
t
io
n
(
n
o
t
c
e
n
s
o
r
e
d
)
m
e
a
n
(s
td
d
e
v
)
-
t
o
t
a
l
4
7
.1
0
(
3
2
.0
1
)
4
4
.4
0
(
3
1
.4
6
)
5
3
.0
3
(3
2
.4
1
)
6
2
.3
3
(
3
1
.1
6
)
3
5
.0
1
(
2
5
.4
4
)
4
7
.7
5
(3
1
.5
5
)
5
8
.8
2
(3
4
.7
2
)
4
8
.7
3
(
3
1
.7
4
)
4
6
.9
1
(
3
1
.0
0
)
5
0
.2
4
(3
3
.5
9
)
4
3
.0
3
(3
1
.6
4
)
if
t
ra
n
s
it
io
n
e
!
e
2
5
.6
7
(
2
0
.1
8
)
2
4
.3
9
(
1
9
.3
7
)
2
8
.5
5
(2
0
.9
0
)
3
4
.7
5
(
2
0
.4
0
)
3
7
.6
2
(
2
5
.9
8
)
2
6
.7
5
(2
0
.6
9
)
3
0
.6
8
(2
3
.1
3
)
2
6
.7
3
(
1
9
.9
1
)
2
4
.1
5
(
1
9
.7
3
)
2
8
.6
9
(2
1
.6
3
)
2
2
.3
8
(1
9
.1
7
)
if
t
ra
n
s
it
io
n
e
!
u
5
0
.4
4
(
3
2
.2
2
)
4
7
.5
5
(
3
1
.8
0
)
5
6
.7
8
(3
2
.2
3
)
6
5
.6
3
(
3
0
.6
2
)
2
6
.0
9
(
1
5
.0
7
)
5
1
.1
4
(3
1
.6
9
)
6
1
.9
9
(3
4
.3
6
)
5
2
.7
9
(
3
1
.8
5
)
5
1
.0
1
(
3
0
.8
8
)
5
3
.6
7
(3
3
.8
8
)
4
5
.1
4
(3
1
.9
0
)
W
a
g
e
D
is
t
ri
b
u
ti
o
n
m
in
im
u
m
9
7
4
9
7
5
9
7
4
1
1
6
6
9
7
8
9
7
4
9
7
7
9
8
3
9
7
5
9
7
5
9
7
4
p
1
0
2
1
3
9
2
0
6
8
2
4
5
5
6
4
0
7
1
9
7
2
2
1
7
6
2
4
2
6
2
2
2
9
2
1
4
7
2
1
1
6
2
0
4
0
m
e
d
ia
n
3
0
3
2
2
8
0
7
3
8
5
6
9
0
1
7
2
5
2
7
3
0
5
3
3
5
4
2
3
1
3
6
2
9
4
4
3
0
2
8
2
9
6
9
p
9
0
5
0
3
0
3
9
7
4
6
4
7
7
1
1
1
6
4
3
4
8
0
4
9
1
3
6
0
8
3
5
3
2
3
4
8
8
6
5
1
9
3
4
6
6
7
p
9
0
/
p
1
0
2
.3
5
1
.9
2
2
.6
3
1
.7
4
1
.7
6
2
.2
5
2
.5
0
2
.3
8
2
.2
7
2
.4
5
2
.2
8
m
e
a
n
(s
td
d
e
v
)
3
3
8
6
(1
4
4
0
)
2
9
4
1
(8
9
1
)
4
2
2
7
(
1
7
2
6
)
8
7
4
9
(2
0
5
9
)
2
4
6
8
(
7
6
2
)
3
3
7
2
(
1
3
4
1
)
3
9
9
2
(1
7
2
3
)
3
5
4
7
(1
5
1
8
)
3
3
1
1
(
1
3
8
9
)
3
4
2
3
(
1
5
0
3
)
3
2
1
2
(
1
3
0
2
)
D
u
r
a
t
io
n
s
a
r
e
e
x
p
r
e
ss
e
d
in
m
o
n
t
h
s
.
M
o
n
e
ta
r
y
v
a
lu
e
s
a
r
e
in
0
0
0
s
o
f
It
a
li
a
n
L
ir
a
.
